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INTRODUCTION
One of the most vexing questions facing economists is why it is so
hard for poor countries to develop workable strategies for escaping the
pernicious and chronic cycles of poverty, corruption and structural
unemployment with which they are plagued. Clearly, a large part of the
answer is that nations' prosperity is dependent on open and functional
markets for products, services, and capital. These markets, in turn,
depend on the ability of people to trade (contract) with one another with
a reasonable degree of confidence. The ability to trade and to contract
requires some sort of system that allows people both to: (a) establish
recognized and stable property rights and (b) enter into reliable
(predictably enforceable) contractual commitments with their counter-
parties, including customers, suppliers, employees and other
constituents.
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In turn, societies in which promises tend to be kept, agreements
tend to be enforced and property rights tend to be respected, are those in
which we observe high levels of trust and cooperative behavior. For
example, Frances Fukuyama argues that the most important cultural
characteristic influencing a nation's prosperity is the presence of trust
and cooperative behavior based upon shared norms.1  Fukuyama
observes that the United States, Germany and Japan (the world's top
economies, at least as of the time when Fukuyama was writing) have
innovative organizations and institutions that reduce transaction costs
(i.e. lower the cost of doing business) by enabling people to easily enter
into contractual relationships and make business deals because they can
trust each other.
2
Fukuyama builds on Max Weber's powerful theory that the
Protestant religious admonition to treat all people (and not just members
of one's sib or family) in a morally acceptable way is a great catalyst to
economic growth.3 As Weber observed, these ethical and ascetic
religious precepts led to growth by dramatically expanding the number
of people who could transact with one another by paving the way for
cooperative economic activity to occur beyond one's immediate kinship
group.4 Fukuyama further observes that in recent years, trust in the
United States, as well as in Japan and Germany, has been rapidly
eroding. 5 For Fukuyama, the information economy and other
technological and scientific advances have led to the rise of
individualism, the diminution of community and a general decrease in
the level of trust in society. 6 Robert Putnam, working in a similar
framework to Fukuyama, though focusing a bit more on "social
networks" as the catalysts for trust, argued that such social networks
were on the decline as people in places like the United States declined
to participate in civic life.7
Working within the general framework, I wish to make two
1. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY 9-11 (1995).
2. ld. at26-31.
3. Id. at 37.
4. MAX WEBER, THE RELIGION OF CHINA: CONFUCIANISM AND TAOISM 237 (Hans H.
Gerth ed. & trans., The Macmillan Company 1964) (1951) ("The great achievement of
ethical religions, above all of the ethical and asceticist sects of Protestantism, was to shatter
the fetters of the sib.").
5. FUKUYAMA, supra note 1, at 23-32
6. JOHN G. BRUN, THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMMUNITY CONNECTIONS 18-20 (2005)
(commenting on Fukuyama's views).
7. See generally ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN
MODERN ITALY (2004).
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contributions to our thinking about the relationship between trust and
growth. First, I want to explain the role that reputation plays in
fostering the high trust environment that is critical to the successful
operation of capital markets and corporate financing transactions
generally. Corporate finance and capital markets rely heavily on the
ability of companies and other firms to develop what is known as
reputational capital. This is true both in theory as well as in practice.
For the industries on which I focus, credit rating agencies, law firms,
investment banks, stock exchanges and accounting firms, reputational
capital historically has been the primary mechanism by which
businesses establish trust in markets and in contracting relationships. In
my view, reputation plays a far greater role than that played either by
religion or social networks, which are the primary institutions upon
which Fukuyama and Putnam, respectively, place their reliance.
Second, and more importantly, I argue that there has been a
collapse in the market demand for reputation, at least in heavily
regulated countries like the United States that increasingly rely on
regulation rather than reputation to protect market participants from
fraud and other forms of abuse. It used to be the case that for a diverse
array of companies and industries involved in the capital markets,
nurturing and maintaining their organizations' reputation was absolutely
critical to their growth and continued success. I argue that this simply is
no longer the case, at least in the U.S.
To a large extent we have moved from a reputational paradigm to
what might best be described as a parasitic paradigm. Clients of
companies involved in the financial markets used to pay a premium to
be able to trade with high reputation companies, as well as with the
clients of high reputation companies. Additionally, when they would
deal with companies with weak or non-existent reputations, they would
proceed, if at all, with great caution and skepticism. Now, company
reputation matters far less than it used to matter for two reasons.
First, improvements in information technology have lowered the
costs of discovering information about people. This, in turn, has made
it worthwhile for individuals involved in the financial markets-
lawyers, investment bankers, accountants, analysts, regulators-to focus
far more on the development of their own individual reputation rather
than on the reputation of the companies for which they work.
Second, law and regulation serve as a substitute for reputational
capital, at least in the minds of regulators and market participants. In
modem times, particularly since the promulgation of the modem
securities laws, market participants have come to rely far more on the
protections of the law, and far less on the comfort provided by
2010]
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reputation, when making investment decisions and in deciding whether
or not to deal with a particular counter-party. The current financial
crisis, in my view, demonstrates that, in reality, regulation is no
substitute for reputation in assuring contractual performance and respect
for property rights.
This Article consists of three parts, in addition to the introduction
and conclusion. In Part I, I explain the role that reputation plays in
corporate governance and capital markets generally. In Part II, I discuss
the erosion of the reputational model in four important contexts: (1)
credit rating agencies; (2) law firms and investment banks specializing
in securities regulation and corporate law as applied to publicly held
companies; (3) stock exchanges (particularly the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE)); and (4) the largest accounting firms. Part III
examines the empirical implications and support for the theory
presented here. One empirical implication is that we should expect
firms in the financial services industry to have weak reputations relative
to firms in other, less regulated industries. A second empirical
implication is that financial firms in countries like the United States,
which have systematic and pervasive laws and regulations for the
financial services industry, locally domiciled will have weak incentives
to invest in developing and maintaining their reputations. The evidence
discussed in Part III of this Article is consistent with the hypothesis
developed in the Article.
In each of these contexts, my story involves important variations
on a single theme. The single theme is the rise and subsequent fall of a
simple economic model in which companies and firms in time period 0
find it rational (profitable) to make investments in reputational capital,
and then, in time period 1 it turns out that it is no longer rational to do
this, so they stop. The investments in human capital that occurred early
on required companies and firms to make costly commitments to being
honest and trustworthy in order to compete successfully in their
businesses. Concomitantly, the later decline in investment in
reputational capital by such companies and firms necessarily resulted in
a dramatic decline in the amount of honesty and trust in the business
sectors in which these companies operate. Corporate downfalls from
Enron to Madoff can, in my view, best be explained by the theory of
reputational decline that is the core of this Article.
I. THE REPUTATIONAL MODEL
The reputational model I employ is very straightforward.
Companies and firms find it profitable, and therefore rational, to invest
money immediately in developing a reputation for honesty, integrity
430 [Vol. 60:427
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Capital Markets
and probity, because doing so allows the company or firm to charge
higher prices, and thus eam superior returns in later periods. The theory
is that resources expended to develop a strong reputation enable the
firms that have developed such reputations to make credible
commitments to clients and counter-parties that they are honest and
reliable, and therefore are desirable contracting partners.
The reputational model posits that companies and firms start their
corporate lives without any reputations. This lack of reputation is of far
more importance and relevance in some businesses than in others.
Where the quality of the product or service being offered by a business
can be evaluated accurately in a short period of time at zero cost, then
reputation matters little. People are willing to buy name-brand wrapped
candy or newspapers at any newsstand or kiosk because the proprietor's
reputation (or lack thereof) is largely irrelevant to a rational purchaser.
A Baby Ruth candy bar or the Wall Street Journal is the same price and
the same quality at every newsstand.
In contrast, the industries in which I am interested (investment
banking, capital markets, accounting, law, etc.) require enormous
amounts of human capital to deliver their products or services. Indeed
in these sectors of the economy, human capital is the only significant
asset that participating businesses actually have. The physical capital
necessary to conduct such businesses is trivial. In these sorts of
businesses, reputation plays a very important role. In such businesses, it
takes a substantial amount of time for a customer to observe the quality
of the businesses' human capital. As Morrison and Wilhelm observe, in
these types of businesses, customers can only "observe the quality of [a
business's] human capital ... after their business relationship is well
advanced. Hence they depend upon their past experiences or the
partnership's reputation to determine the fees they are willing to pay.",
8
In my view, however, analysis of this sort, while historically
accurate, has become dated. Specifically, while it used to be the case
that "[l]oss of reputation [could] be quite costly and even fatal" to
accounting firms like Arthur Andersen, law firms like Vinson and
Elkins and credit rating agencies like Moody's (all of which appear to
have failed flamboyantly in protecting their reputations in the Enron
scandal), I will argue that this is no longer true.9 While these sorts of
firms once depended on their reputations to attract and retain business,
many such firms no longer need to do so. Instead, clients are required
8. Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Partnership Firms, Reputation, and
Human Capital, 94 AM. ECON. REv. 1682, 1683 (2004).
9. Id.
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to use the services of particular firms, so reputation is no longer
particularly important in customer and client decisions about which firm
to deal with. As such, reputation is no longer an asset in which it is
rational to invest heavily.
The concept of reputational risk is central to the theory and
practice of modem domestic and international regulatory policy. For
example, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has
noted that bank regulators place great emphasis on the capacity of the
regulated financial institutions to manage "reputational risk," which it
defines as "the potential that negative publicity regarding an
institution's business practices, whether true or not, will cause a decline
in the customer base, costly litigation, or revenue reductions."1 This
statement by the Fed, however, fails to recognize that reputational risk
exists only for companies that have reputations to put at risk in the first
place. Where a company has no reputation for integrity and honesty in
the first place (or where it has such a reputation but does not rely on it
to attract and retain business), then the company cannot rationally be
trusted. In my view, this accurately describes the state of the world for
the key industries involved in capital markets and corporate finance.
These companies once operated in environments in which reputation
was critical to survival. As discussed below, this is no longer the case.
II. THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE REPUTATIONAL MODEL
The purpose of this section is to analyze the standard historical
assumption that investments in reputation are necessary for success in
businesses that are characterized by products and services involving
what Morrison and Wilhelm describe as "the human capital-intensive
production of experience goods."" Where a business provides services
or produces products that are capital-intensive experience goods, then
firm reputation providing such products or services is critical to the
success, indeed to the survival of the firm. Moreover, in such cases, the
ability of customers to rely on the reputation of the companies with
which they are dealing lowers transaction costs dramatically, thereby
facilitating the development of markets and the creation of wealth.
Because it is no longer as rational (profitable) as it once was for firms to
invest in reputation, we must reformulate our conception of the role of
10. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, DIVISION OF BANKING
SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, SR 96-14, MEMORANDUM TO THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF
SUPERVISION AT EACH FEDERAL RESERVE BANK, RISK-FOCUSED SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS
EXAMINATIONS AND INSPECTIONS (May 24, 1996), available at
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1996/sr9614.htm.
11. Morrison & Wilhelm, supra note 8, at 1683.
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Capital Markets
reputation in corporate governance and in the regulation of capital
markets. This section of the Article develops, in a more granular way,
the point that reputation does not play the central role in the contracting
process in capital markets that it once did.
A. Credit Rating Agencies
Credit ratings from credit rating agencies such as Moody's and
Standard & Poor's provide predictive opinions on an isolated
characteristic of a company-the likelihood that the company will be
able to repay its rated debt in a timely manner. Credit rating agencies
attempt to downplay the role that they play in corporate governance,
claiming that, because their ratings are grounded on analysis of
information generated by the companies themselves, they are not in the
business of searching for and exposing fraud. 12 This claim is somewhat
disingenuous. It is generally accepted that the uninformed investors
who inhabit financial markets clearly rely on the ratings generated by
the major credit rating agencies. Why this is the case is something of a
mystery.
Moreover, as Frank Partnoy has observed, there is a great deal of
evidence indicating that the product generated by the rating agencies,
information, is both stale and inaccurate. 13  The truly abominable
performance of the credit rating agencies in their ratings of a whole host
of debt issues, including Orange County, Mercury Finance, Pacific Gas
& Electric, Enron, WorldCom, and most recently General Motors and
Ford, amply illustrates the point, as do a plethora of academic studies
showing that credit ratings changes lag the market. 14
In particular, the Enron case provides a rather illustrative example
of the credit ratings' lag behind the market.
Neither Standard & Poor's nor Moody's downgraded Enron's debt
below investment grade status until November 28, 2001, four days
before the firm's bankruptcy, when the company's share price had
plunged to a paltry sixty-one cents.
12. Written Statement of Raymond W. McDaniel, President, Moody's Investors
Service, Before the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 21, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/moodys.htm.
13. Legislative Solutions for the Rating Agency Duopoly: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H.
Comm. on Financial Services, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) [hereinafter Partnoy] (statement of
Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/1 09-42.pdf.
14. Id. at 2 ("Numerous academic studies have shown that ratings changes lag the
market .. "); see also Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings Under the Securities
Laws, 68 Fed. Reg. 35,258 (concept release June 12, 2003).
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. . . For Enron, the corporation's $250 million in rated senior
unsecured debt had declined in value from ninety cents to thirty-five
cents on the dollar in the month preceding its downgrade. In other
words, the market rejected the investment grade rating on Enron's
debt before the credit rating agencies exercised their power to
downgrade it.
15
Credit rating agencies have not lived up to their promise as
important components of the corporate govemance infrastructure. And,
as with accounting firms, public choice theory and the economic theory
of regulation provide the best explanation for the failure of credit rating
in American corporate governance. Historically, companies that
utilized the public markets for debt and equity utilized credit rating
agencies for the same reason they utilized the services of accounting
firms: they wanted their financial condition to be verified by a credible,
independent source; that is, by a highly reputable source. Demand for
the services of rating agencies derived from the fact that companies
lowered their capital costs when they subscribed to the services of credit
rating agencies, and the savings from such lower capital costs were
greater than the costs of the subscription fees charged by the credit
rating agencies for assigning a rating to a company's securities.
In the case of credit rating agencies, genuine demand fueled by
market forces was displaced by ersatz demand fueled by regulatory
requirements. This, in turn, led to the cartelization of both of these
industries, as the number of accounting firms auditing large public
companies dropped to four, and the number of credit rating agencies
that enjoy the coveted status as SEC-sanctioned "Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations" (NRSROs) has dropped to three. 6 As
cartelization occurred, consumers were given little, if any choice about
whether to do business with credit rating agencies, and over time we
observed a marked and undeniable diminution in the quality of the
services provided to investors and markets.17
15. Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron,
89 CORNELL L. REv. 394, 405-06 (2004).
16. In 1975, the SEC developed the concept of the "nationally recognized statistical
rating organization" ("NRSRO") to identify particular companies supplying credit ratings
that could be relied on by the Commission for regulatory purposes. The term "NRSRO"
was originally adopted by the Commission in 1975 solely for the purposes of Rule 15c3-1.
See Adoption of Uniform Net Capital Rule and an Alternative Capital Requirement for
Certain Brokers and Dealers, 40 Fed. Reg. 29795 (proposed July 16, 1975) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R pt. 240).
17. On the effects of cartelization in the credit-rating industry, see generally Claire A.
Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43 (2004). Hill calls particular
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SEC regulation, in the form of the NRSRO designation, has
created an artificial demand for ratings, despite their lack of usefulness
to investors.1 8  These regulations require that investors limit their
investments in companies to those whose debt is rated by one of the
three companies designated by the SEC as NRSROs. The SEC uses
NRSRO credit ratings to determine how much capital broker-dealer
firms must maintain when they hold debt securities under Rule 15c3-1
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"). The
ratings of NRSROs are also used to measure the credit risk of short-
term instruments in the regulation of money market funds under Rule
2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "1940 Act").
Issuers of certain debt securities that receive an investment grade
rating from an NRSRO are entitled to register under the Securities Act
of 1933 (the "Securities Act") on the shorter Form S-3. Banking and
other regulators similarly rely upon NRSRO credit ratings to protect
the capital of financial institutions. Thus, many regulated financial
institutions can only purchase certain types of securities if they have
received an investment grade rating from an NRSRO. 19
Thus, the best explanation for the puzzle, that credit rating
agencies simultaneously enjoy great success while providing no
information of value to the investing public, is that the SEC
inadvertently created an artificial regulatory demand for the services of
a small number of favored ratings agencies when it misguidedly
invented the NRSRO designation. This designation has, over time,
caused an artificial demand for ratings, despite their lack of usefulness
to investors.
attention to reforming the industry by "encourag[ing] a less concentrated market structure."
Id. at 45. For empirical evidence on the perceived poor quality of credit rating agencies, see
Rating the Rating Agencies: The State of Transparency and Competition: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of
the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 101-22 (2003), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf1 08-18.pdf. Reduced competition in the
accounting industry, largely as a result of pressures on accounting firms to consolidate in
response to the SEC's auditor independence rules, has "reduced the accounting firms'
incentives to differentiate their products on the basis of quality." Jonathan Macey & Hillary
A. Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification, Independence, and Governance in
the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1167, 1177 (2003).
18. Partnoy, supra note 13, at 2.
19. Statement of Amy Lancellotta, Senior Counsel, Investment Company Institute for
the SEC Hearings on Issues Relating to Credit Rating Agencies (Nov. 21, 2002), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/investcoinstit.htm.
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B. Law Firms and Investment Banks Specializing in Corporate Law
and Securities Regulation for Public Company Clients
The existing general theory of law firm reputation is very simple.
Law firms serve as "gatekeepers." A gatekeeper, in turn, is a
"reputational intermediary" whose role is "to assure investors as to the
quality of the 'signal' sent by the corporate issuer 20 As John Coffee,
and many others have observed, a gatekeeper is a "repeat player" in the
capital markets who enjoys both a reputation for integrity and privileged
access to their clients who are issuers (i.e. companies trying to borrow
money (either directly or by selling securities or by engaging in related
financing transactions)).
The basic idea, of course, is that, because of their reputations,
investors and other counter-parties who have never heard of and do not
trust a particular issuer, have heard of and are willing to trust that
issuer's highly reputed law firm. Therefore, high reputation law firms
(and accounting firms and investment banks) "rent" their reputations to
issuers.
In my view, however, the reputational model as applied to law
firms is no longer particularly robust for three primary reasons. These
reasons are as follows.
1. Improved Information Technology
First, because of improved information technology, the value of
law firms' reputational advantage in relation to their issuer-clients has
declined dramatically. Whereas historically (and particularly prior to
the passage of the securities laws) investors would be reassured when
issuers (whose names and reputations were entirely unknown to them)
hired iconic corporate law firms (whose names and reputations were
well known to them). With improved information technology, however,
clients have direct access to detailed information about issuers.
2. The Relevance of the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Securities
Laws
The second, and closely related point, is that with the passage of
20. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 2 (2006); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the
Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 Bus. LAW. 1403 (2002); Macey, supra note 15, at 405-10; Macey
& Sale, supra note 17, at 1167; WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 5,
17, 24-26 (2002), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport020102.pdf.
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Capital Markets
the securities laws, particularly the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, not only could issuers and
customers communicate more directly (thereby mitigating the historic
asymmetry of information problem that created the need for law firms
to serve as informational intermediaries), but also issuers could credibly
assert for the first time that the various claims they were making about
themselves, as well as the financial information they were reporting,
were accurate. The securities laws passed in the wake of the great stock
market crash of 1929 made issuers subject to civil and criminal
securities fraud liability if their claims were untrue, or if they knowingly
failed to put in clarifying information necessary to make any
information that was disclosed not misleading.
It is noteworthy that under the Securities Act of 1933, which
governs the disclosures that companies make when they sell securities
to the public, disclosures outside of certain formats (i.e. outside of the
formal registration statement and its associated prospectus) are strongly
discouraged. In addition, disclosures in any format (oral, written,
communicated to third parties) that are false for any reason, whether as
the result of intentional fraud or mere negligence, result in strict liability
for the issuer, with the remedy being rescission. 21  This means that
anybody who purchases securities from an issuer in a public offering in
which there was a misstatement of a material fact can return them to the
issuer and receive the offering price for them.22 Because issuers are
strictly liable for material misstatements or omissions in public
offerings, without regard to whether these restatements or omissions
were made intentionally or even negligently, this reduced the demand
for independent verification by law firms and other reputational
intermediaries because the issuers assertions were more reliable.
In addition, underwriters, corporate managers and directors also
are liable for material misstatements or omissions, although they are
entitled to the legal defense known as the "due diligence" defense.
23
The due diligence defense provides a method for escaping liability for
false or misleading statements or from omissions in disclosure
documents. 24 If a non-issuer (recall that the issuer is strictly liable and
therefore cannot take refuge in the due diligence defense) can establish
that it was appropriately "diligent" in analyzing, verifying and
21. James Spindler, Is It Time to Wind Up the Securities Act of 1933?, 29 REGULATION
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investigating the statements made by the issuer, it can avoid liability.
25
In my view, the potential liability of underwriters, corporate managers
and directors has reduced the demand for the verification function of
lawyers, who charge high prices for providing this service, by imposing
the legal requirement that a host of other organizations provide the
service. Since customers are forced by the securities laws to pay for
these verification services, it stands to reason that many of them will be
unwilling to pay law firms again to perform such services.
Moreover, these provisions, along with the anti-fraud provisions of
the securities laws, particularly SEC Rule 1 Ob-5, which makes it illegal
to make a false or misleading statement "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security," reduce the incentives for law firms to
invest in reputational capital and improve the competitive positions of
firms that have not made such investments. 26  This is because the
securities laws make it easier for low-reputation firms (firms that have
made little or no reputation in developing reputation capital) to claim
credibly that they will do a thorough and reliable job of vetting the
statements made by potential issuers. The anti-fraud provisions of the
securities laws enable low-reputation firms to compete with high
reputation firms because the legal liability created by the securities laws
is a substitute for the reputational capital that historically was enjoyed
by the venerable law finns of old. After the passage of the securities
laws, new firms (like the Venture Law Group, Wilson Sonsini and
others) could enter the market for the first time by claiming, even
without having invested in developing reputational capital, that they
could be trusted to refrain from associating themselves with
unscrupulous clients, not because of concerns about reductions in the
value of their reputational capital, but because of concerns about civil
and criminal liability under the securities laws.
3. Lawyers' Specialization Functions
Another factor in the decline of law firms' incentives to invest in
reputation is the dramatic increase in the sophistication of client's in-
house counsels and the concomitant increased specialization of lawyers'
functions. It used to be the case, in decades past, that law firms would
handle all or virtually all of the legal work for their corporate clients.
The big firms would advise on banking law, corporate law, securities
law, intellectual property, antitrust, commercial law, international
25. Id.
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
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Capital Markets
business transactions, franchising law, employment and labor relations,
contracts, and torts. These firms also would litigate as well as do the
corporate work on behalf of their big clients. Nowadays, in-house
lawyers are much more sophisticated in their selection of outside
counsel. In-house lawyers develop detailed, highly textured
information about individual lawyers rather than firms nowadays. This
means that corporate clients no longer choose law firms so much as they
choose individual lawyers to represent them in particular matters. This,
in turn, means two things.
First, it means that investments in law firm reputations are not as
valuable as they used to be because it is the reputation of individual
lawyers within firms (or perhaps departments of lawyers within firms)
and not the law firms themselves that attract clients. Second, it means
that, to the extent that there is still a payoff to law firms in the form of
increased client demand from investing in reputation, this payoff has
been reduced because the client demand is likely to be only for the
particular lawyer or legal group within the firm that has developed the
reputation.
Now that the reputation of individual lawyers has replaced the
reputation of law firms, the incentive for lawyers to invest in their own
reputations is on the rise, and the incentive of lawyers to invest in their
firms' reputations is on the wane. Individual lawyers change firms far
more often than they used to. Lawyers' incentives to monitor their
colleagues has diminished, not only because lawyers no longer have the
expertise to monitor other lawyers in the firm with different
specializations, but also because lawyers no longer have the incentive
to do this. Of course, this incentive has been reduced even further by
the replacement of the general partnership, which provided strong
incentives for lawyers' accountants and other professionals to monitor
their colleagues, with the professional corporation and the limited
liability partnership, which eliminates those incentives by removing the
risk that lawyers who fail to monitor their colleagues will face liability.
C. The Organized Stock Exchanges
Organized stock exchanges, particularly the NYSE, used to play an
important role in U.S. corporate governance. To some extent, the
exchanges provided secondary market liquidity for the equity of
companies with publicly traded securities. But as technology
developed, over-the-counter trading, particularly electronic trading,
became a superior, low-cost substitute for costly exchange listing. But
exchanges, particularly the NYSE, continued to thrive as reputational
intermediaries, at least until fairly recently.
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The role of the stock exchanges is easy to describe: in days gone-
by when a public corporation listed on a stock exchange, that
corporation was making a credible commitment to abide by a set of
corporate governance rules designed to maximize shareholder wealth.
The commitment was made credible by the threat of delisting, which
historically had draconian effects on companies because of the lack of
alternative trading venues for shares in public companies. Over time,
however, advances in technology and the development of markets have
weakened the primacy of the traditional exchanges. A whole host of
competitors for the traditional stock exchanges has emerged.
Two decades ago, it would have been unimaginable for companies
that were eligible for listing on the NYSE to choose a competing venue,
but it is common for companies to do so today. For example, prominent
companies such as Automatic Data Processing (ADP), Amazon.com,
Amgen, Apple, Dell, Fifth Third Bancorp, Intel, Microsoft, News
Corporation, Oracle, and Sun Microsystems, all of which easily meet
the NYSE's listing requirements, opt out of listing on the NYSE in
favor of being traded on the NASDAQ stock market. There does not
appear to be any reputational cost associated with this choice.
Traditionally firms moved from one trading venue to another (i.e.
from the NASDAQ to the NYSE) because they had grown and viewed
the move as a promotion from the over-the-counter markets which
catered to start-up companies, to the NYSE, which was the venue of
choice for mature, successful companies. Decisions by highly
successful companies, such as Google and Microsoft, to remain in the
over-the-counter markets, along with the ability of firms such as
Hewlett-Packard to be simultaneously listed on both the NYSE and
NASDAQ, illustrate the change in the traditional ordering and the
decline of the reputational model.
The modem stock exchange is subject to vigorous competition from a
variety of sources, including both rival exchanges and alternative
trading venues, such as Electronic Communications Networks (ECNs)
and Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs). This competition has
strained the exchanges' capacity for self-regulation and undermined
their incentives to regulate in the public interest with respect to issues
related to the corporate governance of their members.
27
Moreover, the available evidence indicates that organized
exchanges do not even act as stand-alone regulators anymore. There is
no longer a reputational advantage associated with an exchange listing.
27. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 112 (2008).
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Modem technology, the securities fraud rules and the SEC's
unwillingness to allow exchanges any leeway in the way that different
exchanges regulate listing firms all have combined to eviscerate the
ability of competing trading venues, particularly that of the NYSE to
compete by serving as a reputational intermediary for listing firms.
Instead, today all trading venues are properly understood as mere
conduits for the SEC, which coordinates the corporate governance
regulations that ostensibly are promulgated under the exchanges'
authority as self-regulatory organizations. 28  As the Special Study on
Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance,
pointed out, "the SEC had adopted a practice of encouraging exchanges
'voluntarily' to adopt given corporate governance listing standards and
in the process has urged the exchanges, listed companies and
shareholders to reach consensus on those standards." 29 The SEC now
coordinates the regulatory price fixing among the exchanges' self-
regulatory organizations with respect to every facet of the exchanges'
relationships with listed companies. Thus, the SEC has undermined the
traditional way that exchanges competed with one another by serving as
a reputational intermediary and by providing and enforcing efficient
corporate governance rules and to enhance the reputations of listing
firms.
As I have pointed out before, a powerful example of the
reputational demise of the NYSE is the Exchange's inability to enforce
its most powerful rule concerning corporate governance. This was the
rule requiring listed firms to limit themselves to having only one class
of common stock outstanding, and to providing that class of stock with
no less and no more than one vote per share of stock.
At the height of the takeover wave, when corporate managers
wanted to insulate themselves from takeover, they violated this rule by
28. The available evidence here consists largely of series of episodes in which the
exchanges failed to self-regulate, often followed by a coordinated regulation led by the SEC.
Self-regulation by the exchanges is in general dysfunctional in significant part because
securities are often traded simultaneously in multiple venues, thus inhibiting the ability of
exchanges to unilaterally enforce regulations. See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara,
From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV.
563, 575, 577-79 (2005) ("As a purely descriptive matter, the available evidence is
inconsistent with the assertion that rival trading venues compete to produce corporate law
rules. Rather, the accurate depiction of the competitive situation is that the SEC coordinates
the regulatory standards of the exchanges and the Nasdaq in order to prevent competition
among these trading venues from occurring at all.").
29. Robert Todd Lang et al., Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and
Corporate Governance, 57 Bus. LAW. 1487, 1503 (2002).
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adopting so-called "dual class" capital structure. 30  The NYSE found
that when it threatened to delist major companies who violated this rule
from the exchange, the companies, like General Motors and Dow Jones,
Inc., responded by agreeing to delist, a result that would have imposed
significantly higher costs on the NYSE than on the listed companies,
because the NYSE would lose listing fees and trading revenue, while
the listed companies would simply move their listings to a rival venue
like the NASDAQ Stock Market.
Unable to enforce its own accounting rules, the NYSE lobbied the
SEC to prevent these companies from delisting or, barring that, to
require the NASDAQ to adopt a one-share-one-vote capital structure in
order to eliminate the incentive to delist for companies desiring a dual
class voting structure. In other words, as the Exchange began to face
competition for listings, it began to lose the ability to enforce its own
rules of corporate governance. This, in turn, meant that companies
listing on the Exchange could no longer claim that such listing provided
a credible commitment to abide by the NYSE's corporate governance
rules in the future.
D. Accounting Firms
Likewise, the role of accounting firms in corporate governance has
declined over time. Historically, the services of independent accounting
firms was demanded by companies to perform audits in order to signal
to suppliers of capital (debtors and creditors alike) that the firm was not
engaged in financial fraud.3' Investors who did not feel that they could
30. See SEC Office of Chief Economist, Update-The Effects of Dual-Class
Recapitalizations on Shareholder Wealth: Including Evidence from 1986 and 1987, Table 1
(July 16, 1987); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and
the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988). Gordon counts over
eighty public firms that have "adopted, or proposed to adopt, capital structures with two
classes of common stock." Id. In footnote 2, Gordon adds, "[o]ne recent estimate is that
since 1985 the number of companies with dual classes of stock has risen from 119 to 306."
Id. at n.2; see also Linda Sandler, Class Struggle: Dual Stock Categories Spur Powerful
Debate over Stability vs. Gain-Shares With Multiple Votes Annoy Corporate Raiders and
Many Investors Too-If You Don't Like It, Sell, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1988, at 1.
31. Interestingly, outside auditors do not perform any services for a company that the
company does not already perform for itself. The role of the auditor is not to prepare
financial reports for clients (that is the role of the accountant). Rather, the auditor's role is
to provide a reliable verification of the company's financial reports. See generally Rick
Antle, Auditor Independence, 22 J. ACCT. REs. 1 (1984); George J. Benston, The Value of
the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, 44 ACCT. REV. 515 (1969); Ronald R.
King, Reputation Formation for Reliable Reporting: An Experimental Investigation, 71
ACCT. REV. 375 (1996); Norman B. Macintosh et al., Accounting as Simulacrum and
Hyperreality: Perspectives on Income and Capital, 25 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC'Y 13 (2000).
Brian W. Mahew, Auditor Reputation Building, 39 J. ACCT. REs. 599 (2001); Brian W.
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Capital Markets
trust an issuing company felt that they could better trust the information
generated by such a company if it committed to procuring audited
financial statements.32  Auditor reputation is not only central to
understanding why accounting firms began conducting audits from an
historical perspective. In addition:
[A]uditors' reputations are central to the standard economic theory of
auditing. Only auditors with reputations for honesty and integrity are
valuable to audit-clients. The idea is that, absent a reputation for
honesty and integrity, the auditor's verification function loses its
value. In theory, then, auditors invest heavily in creating and
maintaining their reputations for performing honest, high-quality
audits. High-quality audits by independent auditors who have good
reputations are assured. The quality assurance is derived from the fact
that performing poor-quality audits diminishes the value of the audit
firm's investment in reputation.
33
This historical, "pre-Enron" analysis was used to explain why
accounting firms had strong incentives to conduct honest audits, even in
situations in which their clients preferred dishonest audits.
There was a time that the audit function was carried out in a market
environment that induced high quality financial reporting. In that era,
accounting firms were willing to put their seal of approval on the
financial records of a client company only if the company agreed to
conform to the high standards imposed by the accounting profession.
Investors trusted accountants because investors knew that any
accounting firm that was sloppy or corrupt could not stay in business
for long. Auditors had significant incentives to do 'superior audit
work' because 'auditors with strong reputations could command a fee
premium, and high fees 'signaled' quality in the auditing market.
34
In other words, audit firms had incentives to provide high quality
audit services because they wanted to protect their reputation for
independence and integrity.
In a world in which auditors have both invested in developing high
quality reputations and in which no single client represents more than
a tiny fraction of total billings, high audit quality seems assured.
Mayhew et al., The Effect of Accounting Uncertainty and Auditor Reputation on Auditor
Objectivity, AUDITING J. PRAC. & THEORY, Sept. 1, 2001, at 49; Ross L. Watts & Jerold L.
Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence, 26 J.
L. &ECON. 613 (1983).
32. Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Anderson Different? An
Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 263, 266 (2004).
33. Id.
34. Macey & Sale, supra note 17, at 1168.
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Under these conditions, any potential gain to an auditor from
performing a shoddy audit, much less from participating in a client's
fraud, would be vastly outweighed by the diminution in value to the
auditor's reputation.
Thus,
[p]ublic accountants knew they had a lot to lose if their clients'
information turned out to be false or misleading. Auditors who did a
superior job would reduce the chance of their clients' issuing
unreliable information and so reduce their own risk of being sued by
aggrieved investors. Such suits are costly to auditors; even
unsuccessful suits damage their valuable reputations.
36
This view of the economics of the accounting industry critically
depends on the existence of competition among accounting firms.
Accounting firms who compete do so along the vector of quality. When
these firms cease to operate in a competitive environment, their
incentive to produce high quality results evaporates.37 In fact, there is
no evidence that accounting firms compete on the basis of quality any
longer. In this environment, when clients are selecting their accounting
firms, price, and, perhaps other, more subjective factors such as
personal relationships, or even malleability, will substitute for quality,
to the extent that there is any competition at all. The demonstrable lack
of quality differentials among accounting firms means that accounting
firms no longer serve as effective gate-keepers for issuing companies.
Audit firms, like the organized stock exchanges, are, therefore,
ineffective corporate governance devices in the modem world. Simply
put, one cannot distinguish between large public companies on the basis
of the quality of the auditors they have selected Audits have become
more expensive, not because the quality of audits has improved but
because competition has decreased and companies are required to
purchase ever-increasing quantities of audit services in order to comply
with regulatory requirements.38
In other words, not only has regulation imposed unnecessary
observable costs on industry (in the form of higher prices and restricted
35. Eisenberg & Macey, supra note 32, at 267.
36. Financial Reporting Quality: Implications of Accounting Research: Submission to
the (Canadian) S. Standing Comm. on Banking, Trade and Commerce (2002) (statement of
Daniel B. Thornton) (on file with author).
37. According to a 2002 Gallup poll, "70% of U.S. investors stated that business
accounting issues were hurting the investment climate 'a lot."' Paul Atkins, Comm'r, SEC,
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output), regulation has also led to unfortunate unobservable costs, which
come in the form of the reduced ability of companies to distinguish
themselves from their creditors' on the basis of the reputations of their
auditors.
III. DATA ON REPUTATION
The theory developed in this Article is that the value to financial
institutions of investing in reputation declines to the extent that a
regulatory system that people believe is effective is put into place. This
is because reputation and regulation, both of which serve the role of
providing contracting parties with some reassurance that they won't be
cheated or taken advantage of in the course of financial dealings, are
substitutes for one another.
This theory has at least two empirical implications. First, as a
general matter, to the extent that a particular industry, such as the
financial services industry, is highly regulated, then the individual firms
in that industry will have fewer incentives to invest in reputational
capital. Thus, we would expect that, in general, firms in the financial
services industry will have weaker reputations than firms in less
regulated industries.
Second, in a country such as the United States, which has a vast
and complete system of financial regulation and securities law as well
as a highly vigorous enforcement regime for such laws, locally
domiciled financial firms will be relatively less willing to invest in
developing their reputations.
The reputation consulting firms conducted over 70,000 online
interviews with the general public in thirty-two countries on six
continents during the months of January and February 2009.39 More
than 190,000 ratings were used to create what appear to be reliable
measures of the corporate reputation of the 1,300 largest companies in
the world.40  These companies represent twenty-five distinct
39. REPUTATION INST., 2009 GLOBAL REPUTATION PULSE: THE WORLD'S MOST
REPUTABLE COMPANIES: GLOBAL SECTION 2 (2009),
http://www.corporatereputation.it/idee/docs/Global-Pulse-2009-Free-GlobalReport.pdf
[hereinafter 2009 GLOBAL REPUTATION PULSE].
40. Id. The data in this section of the Article is taken from surveys performed and
analyzed by the Reputation Institute. The list of the world's most reputable industries and
countries is available at the Reputation Institute's website. Reputation Institute,
http://www.reputationinstitute.com (last visited Mar. 18, 2010). Reputation Institute (RI) is
a private advisory and research firm headquartered in New York with representation in more
than twenty countries around the world. Founded in 1997, RI is a pioneer and global leader
in the field of corporate reputation management, with a mission to help companies create
value from reputation. 2009 GLOBAL REPUTATION PULSE, supra note 39, at 24. RI connects
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[hereinafter 9 I ].
40. Id. The data in this section of the rticle is taken fr s r eys rfonned d
analyzed by the Reputation Institute. he list f the orld's st r table i stries nd
countries is available at t e e tati n I stit te's ite. t tion t t ,
http://www.reputationinstitute.com (last visited ar. 18,2010). e tation I stit t ( I) i
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industries.4 '
Interestingly, counter-intuitively, and consistent with the theory
propounded in this Article, as a general matter, companies in emerging
countries, particularly those in the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil,
Russia, India and China) rank extremely high in terms of their
reputations.42 For example, Corporate India has the best reputed
companies. 43 Of the twenty-seven Indian companies ranked among the
six hundred largest in the world, almost ninety percent received scores
above the global mean, with five ranking among the "Top 50."" Only
the United States had more in the "Top 50" (seventeen companies), but
of course, the United States has five times the number of companies on
the list of large companies than India.45
Further, "corporate trust [is] higher in Emerging Markets, [and]
Lower in Industrialized [(i.e. relatively highly regulated)] Markets. 46
More specifically:
[p]roportionally, the largest companies in Brazil, Russia, India and
China enjoy a stronger emotional connection with consumers than the
largest companies in the industrialized world... [Moreover], [o]f the
289 companies from the US, Japan, the UK, France and Germany,
45% have reputations below the global average, while only 34% of the
142 companies from Brazil, Russia, India and China have below-
average reputations, with Chinese companies dragging down the
BRIC average substantially. These results highlight that large
companies in emerging countries have greater success in building
relevance with the general public. It also points to the challenge of
redefining stakeholder interactions that many companies face in more
developed markets. For example, despite significant presence on the
a global network of practitioners and academics working towards this common mission
through research, analysis, and consulting. Id. In 2009, Reputation Institute's Global
Reputation Pulse project surveyed more than sixty thousand people in thirty-two countries,
to measure consumer perceptions of one thousand companies in North America, Latin
America, Europe, Asia, Australia, and Africa. Id. at 2. RI works with corporate leaders
who trust RI to use its cutting-edge knowledge, international network, and experienced
advisors to help develop resilient reputing strategies. Id. at 24.
41. These industries are: Airlines & Aerospace, Automotive, Beverage, Chemicals,
Computer, Conglomerate, Construction/Engineering, Consumer Products, Electrical &
Electronics, Energy, Financial-Bank, Financial-Diversified Services, Financial-Insurance,
Food & Tobacco, Health Care, Industrial Products, Information & Media, Pharmaceuticals,
Raw Materials, Retail-Food, Retail-General Services, Telecommunications, Transport &
Logistics, and Utilities.
42. 2009 GLOBAL REPUTATION PULSE, supra note 39, at 5.
43. Id. at 6.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 5.
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list (31 companies), no German company was among the global Top
50.
With the exception of tobacco, the financial services industry is at
the bottom of the list of companies in terms of reputation.48 Here below
is a list of industries, ranked in order of their reputation, from highest to
lowest. Not only is the financial services industry at the bottom of the
list of industries when industries are ranked by reputation, but U.S.
financial services firms are at the bottom of the list of firms in the
financial services industry when ranked by reputation.49
To summarize the data, there are no financial institutions among
the top twenty companies in the world when ranked by reputation. The
highest ranked financial institution in the world on the basis of
reputation is China Merchants Bank, which is ranked twenty-fourth.
The next financial institution on the list is the Russian bank Sberbank,
which is ranked twenty-seventh, followed by the State Bank of India at
twenty-nine. The highest ranked U.S. financial institution on the list is
Warren Buffett's firm, Berkshire Hathaway, which is ranked sixty-sixth.
The list of major U.S. financial institutions that did not even make the
list of global companies ranked by reputation is rather remarkable.5 °
Absent from the list are: Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs,
JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley.5'
CONCLUSION
From the perspective of economic theory, companies care if they
are trusted in the marketplace because companies whose customers,
counter-parties and suppliers trust them will-all else being equal-be
more profitable than companies whose constituents don't trust them.
But developing trust is not. free. It's not even particularly cheap.
Rather, developing trust requires a costly investment in reputational
capital. In environments in which reputation matters, firms will invest
in their reputations because such investments cause rational
constituents, particularly customers, counter-parties, and suppliers to
trust them. This is because, after having made the costly investment
47. 2009 GLOBAL REPUTATION PULSE, supra note 39, at 5-6.
48. Id. at 10.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 19-23. Aetna, Aflac, AIG, Allstate, Bank of America, Bank of NY Mellon,
Capital One Financial, Chubb, Cigna, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, The Hartford Financial
Services Group, JP Morgan Chase, Liberty Mutual Insurance, MetLife, Morgan Stanley,
Progressive Insurance, Prudential Insurance, State Farm Insurance, Travelers, and Wells
Fargo.
51. Id. at 6.
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required to develop a good reputation, a company's constituents know
that it will be irrational for the company making such a reputation to
cheat or to otherwise be dishonorable, since doing so will be irrational.
Cheating is irrational for firms with good reputations that have been
costly and time-consuming to develop, because it results in a lower
demand for the products and services of such companies, while
producing only limited, short-term benefits.
In this Article I have argued that a variety of exogenous
developments, particularly the promulgation of the securities laws, but
also the rise of more efficient capital markets and improved technology,
are making it less rational for certain companies, particularly credit
rating agencies, law firms, investment banks, stock exchanges and
accounting firms to invest in (or to maintain their investments in)
developing strong reputations for integrity and honesty. Rather, such
organizations are likely to monetize the value of their reputations by
participating in one-shot frauds and declining to invest in the external
and internal controls necessary to maintain their reputations.
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